I am a PhD candidate in economics at the University of Bonn. My research interests are mechanism design, social choice theory, and information aggregation.
Work in Progress
We consider a multi-sender cheap talk model, where the receiver faces uncertainty over whether senders have aligned or state-independent preferences. This uncertainty generates a trade-off between giving sufficient weight to the most informed aligned senders and minimizing the influence of the unaligned. We show that preference uncertainty diminishes the benefits from specialization, i.e., senders receiving signals with more dispersed accuracy. When preference uncertainty becomes large, it negates them entirely, causing qualified majority voting to become the optimal form of communication. Our results demonstrate how political polarization endangers the ability of society to reap the benefits of specialization in knowledge.
Bad Compromises (available upon request)
We study welfare maximizing and strategy-proof mechanisms in settings where agents have single-peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives. Our main finding is that restricting attention to surjective mechanisms can decrease welfare. However, the leftmost and rightmost alternatives are always in the image of a utilitarian mechanism. All other alternatives between these two are compromises. We call a compromise a bad compromise if the possibility to exclude it from the set of potential outcomes increases welfare. We find that for three alternatives up to 50% of utilitarian welfare can be lost if the compromise cannot be excluded. Our analysis gives a new justification for constitutional provisions that limit the scope of negative majorities.