• About ME

    I am a fourth year PhD candidate in economics at the University of Bonn. In the current academic year I am visiting Yale University.


    My research interests are mechanism design, social choice theory, and information aggregation.

  • Research

    Work in Progress

    We study a multi-sender cheap talk game in which senders have private signals of heterogeneous informativeness about a binary state of the world. Under common interests, all levels of informativeness are weighted differently by the receiver. Specialization, i.e., more heterogeneous signal quality, improves the receiver’s ability to match the state. When we allow for private interests, complete differentiation of signal qualities breaks down. Senders whose preferences are not aligned with the receiver’s claim to have highly informative signals about the state of the world. These fake experts prevent optimal signal discrimination and devalue messages sent by senders with the most informative signals, diminishing the gains from specialization. If preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous, any differentiating weighting of messages breaks down, and voting becomes the most informative equilibrium.

    Bad Compromises (available upon request)

    We study welfare maximizing and strategy-proof mechanisms in settings where agents have single-peaked preferences over a finite set of alternatives. Our main finding is that restricting attention to surjective mechanisms can decrease welfare. However, the leftmost and rightmost alternatives are always in the image of a utilitarian mechanism. All other alternatives between these two are compromises. We call a compromise a bad compromise if the possibility to exclude it from the set of potential outcomes increases welfare. We find that for three alternatives up to 50% of utilitarian welfare can be lost if the compromise cannot be excluded. Our analysis gives a new justification for constitutional provisions that limit the scope of negative majorities.